1. Budget outlays were adjusted only for unemployment insurance benefits and expenditures under the Emergency Employment Act. The possibility that some other expenditures might be lower and some (notably interest) higher was recognized, though they were not estimated. However, the unified budget totals for the fiscal years tend to obscure the basically smoother pace of increase in expenditures seen in the national income accounts (NIA). In measuring federal expenditures, the national income accounts are generally much closer to the unified budget than they were to earlier budget concepts. The sharply widened gap between the two concepts in expenditures for fiscal 1973 is explained by three major items, which reduce unified budget expenditures relative to NIA spending (see Table 2 ). First, although more financial assets are to be sold in 1973 than in previous years, the sharp reduction in other financial transactions, mainly loans, makes the NIA total higher relative to the unified total than has been true in previous years.2 Second, the adjustment for the timing of defense expenditures is expected to shift from -$700 million in 1972 to + $3 billion in 1973 in reflection of a large volume of defense goods to be delivered in fiscal 1973 but paid for in other fiscal years. Third, mainly as a result of extraordinary receipts from offshore oil leases that appear as negative expenditures, a net adjustment of $2.7 billion is made to the unified budget in reaching the NIA total. Another $1 billion that is essentially a modification in the timing of expenditures that even the national income accounts concept does not adjust for probably has little economic. significance: The budget proposes for 1972 a thirteenth monthly payment of the federal subsidy to state welfare expenditures, which will swell cash expenditures in 1972 and reduce them in 1973. The relationship between unified and NIA receipts is shown in Table 3 . The difference between the two grew from $3.9 billion in fiscal 1971 to $6.4 billion in fiscal 1973.
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In an analysis of combined receipts and expenditures adjustments, the 2. In the recent past, the adjustment to exclude financial transactions was roughly offset by the adjustments to include certain items recorded on a net basis in the unified budget. Currently, the volume of financial transactions is declining. Thus, the gap between unified and NIA expenditures has widened. fiscal policy revealed by the national income accounts concept is somewhat different from that implied by the unified budget. In both, there is a 1971-72 swing of roughly the same size from a full employment surplus to a deficit. However, once the financial transactions and pure timing factors are accounted for, the fiscal 1973 NIA budget does not move back to balance but has a deficit of about the same magnitude as fiscal 1972.
The planned fiscal impact of the budget program can be seen more clearly in estimates projected by half-year intervals ( Table 4 ). All of the increase in stimulus is planned for the first half of calendar 1972, a result of both an unusually large increase in expenditures and a growth in revenues much smaller than normal because of reductions in individual and corporate income taxes legislated in 1971.
Of the $20 billion increase in expenditures estimated for the first half of The increase in benefits under H.R. 1 was to be financed out of the "unexpected" actuarial surplus that gradually built up because rising wages were not taken into account in calculating the tax rates needed to finance the old-age, survivors, and disability (OASDI) expenditures. In fact, this surplus was so large that H.R. 1 proposed lowering the OASDI tax rate from 9.2 to 8.4 percent and shifting the 0.8 percent difference to the hospital insurance (HI) tax rate (currently at 1.2 percent) to help finance medicare for the disabled. (Apparently no consideration was given to lowering the tax rate instead of inaugurating a new program.) The reduction in the OASDI tax rate was not quite adequate to finance the new HI program, which was expected to require a rate of 1.2 percent over and above the 1.2 now financing it. Consequently. H.R. 1 proposed raising the combined (OASDHI) tax rate from its current 10.4 to 10.8 percent-8.4 for OASDI; 2.4 for HI (see Table 5 ).
The further increase in benefits proposed by Chairman Mills would utilize not only the periodic actuarial surplus, but another surplus that would be created if Congress accepted the recommendations of the 1971 Ad- visory Council on Social Security made in its required periodic review of the program. In March 1971, following an evaluation of the program's long-term financing, the council recommended two major changes in the actuarial calculations. First, reasonable rates of increase should be assumed for both wages and prices; and second, the system should be placed on a pay-as-you-go basis. In the past, the long-range evaluation assumed (1) no increase in wages or prices for the seventy-five years into the future that the calculation covers (the level wage assumption), and (2) the need to impose in the relatively near future the tax rate required to finance the benefits over the entire period (the level cost assumption).3 These two assumptions have led in the past to the "overfinancing" of social security benefits; that is, the revenues raised from the payroll tax have exceeded the benefits paid. The reason is that though the level wage assumption tended to understate both, the miscalculation was greater for receipts than for expenditures.
Under the level wage assumption, average taxable wages were assumed to remain the same as those in the year the calculation was made. Average benefits, however, were projected to rise in reflection of the history of wages: When, in fact, wages rose, revenues immediately increased above those projected, while benefits rose much less over projections than revenues because their calculation already incorporated the effect of past increases in wages on future benefits. Thus, a second actuarial surplus arose.
Adoption of the second recommendation-to put the system on a payas-you-go basis-would permit the delay of increases in the tax rate. The tax rate schedule currently written in the law provides for the level cost tax rate to take effect in 1976.4 Because of demographic factors, the cost of the benefits (expressed as a percent of payroll) will be lower over the next forty years than after the first decade of the next century.5 So early an implementation of the level cost tax rate would mean sizable annual sur-3. The actuarial evaluation projects benefit payments based on demographic trends and wage histories. With the same assumed interest rate, the future streams of both benefit payments and taxable wages are discounted to present value. The present value of the benefits is then expressed as a percent of the present value of the wages and is known as the level cost of the benefits. Table 5. 5. Because of the sharp increase in the birth rate between 1946 and 1957 and its subsequent decline, the number of retirees relative to the number of people of working age will begin to rise after 2010. pluses in the trust funds during this period, and massive accumulation of U.S. government securities. The interest earned on these bonds was to be used to meet the higher costs of benefits in the twenty-first century caused by the increased number of beneficiaries. Since it also constitutes a government expenditure, it does not reduce the net real cost of the benefits in any year. The council therefore recommended that the program be put on a pay-as-you-go basis.6
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The amendment to H.R. 1 submitted by Chairman Mills accepts both the dynamic wage assumption in the actuarial calculation and the pay-asyou-go principle. However, instead of devoting the actuarial surplus to a reduction of the tax rate, his amendment proposes using it to finance a 20 percent across-the-board increase in benefits, instead of the 5 percent in the original bill. The prescheduled tax rate increases are also spaced out to follow more closely the demographic patterns. Table 5 shows the OASDI tax rates as embodied in current law, as proposed by H.R. 1, and as envisaged in the Mills proposal. Chairman Mills has not proposed an alteration in the hospital insurance tax rate, and it is uncertain whether the HI rates proposed in H.R. 1 would be increments to the OASDI tax rates contained in his amendment. Table 5 also shows the current tax rates for hospital insurance and those proposed in H.R. 1.
Although the OASDI tax rate is not raised from the current 9.2 percent, an increase in the HI tax rate could make quite a difference in the resulting combined tax rate (Table 6) . If the 9.2 percent OASDI tax rate is added to the 2.4 percent rate in H.R. 1, the combined rate would jump from its current 10.4 to 11.6 percent. If the OASDI rate is combined with the rates already scheduled for HI, the increase would be only 0.1 percentage point to 10.5, where it would remain until 1976.
In addition to the higher overall tax rate, the Mills proposal would increase the ceiling on wages subject to tax from the current $9,000 to $10,200 (as does H.R. 1) and then to $12,000 in 1973 with automatic adjustments thereafter tied to the increase in average earnings.7 Both H.R. 1 and the Mills proposal assume, as do the revenue estimates in the budget, that the increase in the wage ceiling would be made retroactive to Janu- Table 5. ary 1, 1972. Historically, Congress has never legislated retroactive increases in either the tax rate or the wage ceiling. Even if it followed its precedent in this case and failed to raise the ceiling retroactively, passage of the 11.6 percent rate would incur the loss of at most $1 billion.
THE IMPACT OF INCREASED WITHHOLDING
The third major change affecting the fiscal outlook is the large increase in individual income taxes withheld (see Table 7 ). This increase resulted from a change in the withholding tax schedule designed to correct for underwithholding, and developed in spite of an accompanying liberalization in personal exemptions and in the low income allowance. In addition to the exemptions for each member of the family, an additional exemption can be claimed if the taxpayer is single or if one member of a married couple is not employed. If all the potential exemptions of these new types were claimed, eligible taxpayers with annual incomes of up to $17,000 would experience, depending on marital status, sizable reductions in their withholdings. In addition, a taxpayer can claim additional exemptions if his itemized deductions exceed certain ratios; for example, a taxpayer with income of $8,000 or less can claim one additional exemption if deductions are between 20 and 30 percent of income, two if they are between 30 and 40 percent, and so on.
The first quarter 1972 estimate for personal taxes (national income Table 8 shows the full employment expenditures and receipts adjusted for these changes. These estimates assume that the retroactive-payment for revenue sharing will be made after midyear, Table 2 , note c. b. If, as assumed here, the overwithholding continues through calendar 1972, the refund will be shown in the NIA accounts on a seasonally adjusted basis at an annual rate of $10 billion in each half of 1973. However, the actual cash refunds will be heavily concentrated in the first half of the year.
The excess withholding drops to $10 billion in the second quarter and will remain at that level for the rest of the year. Under these assumptions, no fiscal stimulus is recorded in the first half of 1972, in marked contrast with what was planned. Instead, a sharp fiscal stimulus will appear in the second half of the year, arising partly from the retroactive payment for revenue sharing to state and local governments. Its impact on the economy will depend on the rate at which the state and local governments spend it.
What happens in the first half of 1973 depends on the social security tax rate that is finally legislated (an 11.6 percent rate effective January 1, 1973, is assumed in Table 8 ) and whether withheld tax rates are adjusted, either by legislation or because individuals file the new exemption form. If the overwithholding continues and social security tax rates are raised, the bud-get would move toward restraint in the first half of 1973, even though it would show a $4 billion full employment deficit (on the NIA basis) for that period. If the overwithholding is wholly or partially eliminated, the deficit would be larger. On the other hand, if part of the increased withholding reflects increased liabilities, the deficit will be smaller. Even if the changes are not as dramatic as those shown in Table 8 , the fiscal 1972 budget is turning out to be much less stimulative, and the 1973 budget much more stimulative, than planned.
Discussion
WILLIAM BRAINARD SUGGESTED that the shift in the fiscal position due to overwithholding might have a substantially smaller impact on economic activity than would other fiscal actions of the same dollar amount. The permanent income hypothesis and, indeed, any theory of rational consumer behavior would put more weight on the size of tax liabilities than on the timing of tax payments. James Duesenberry replied that part of the problem associated with overwithholding is that most taxpayers do not know what is happening and cannot identify the drop in their take-home pay as purely transitory. Nancy Teeters and Barry Bosworth noted that increases in withholding were pronounced in the income brackets between $6,000 and $15,000, and also among single people, and married couples without children. They expected such groups to have particularly high marginal propensities to consume. Thomas Juster suggested, however, that the overwithholding is closely linked to home ownership, affecting particularly people who itemize large deductible home ownership costs; and he regarded this phenomenon, by and large, as concentrated toward the upper end of the income scale.
Arthur Okun wondered about the timing of the impact of any revenuesharing payments that might be made later this year. He suspected that a payment to states and localities in the closing months of 1972 would not significantly increase expenditures of these governments or reduce their taxation within 1972. Bosworth concluded, however, that, even allowing for lags, the fiscal prospects outlined in the Teeters paper pointed to a new budgetary stimulus to economic activity late in 1972 and early in 1973.
